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Abstract 
We present an econometric analysis of the determinants of the labour share in seven emerging 
economies from 1995 to 2014. We focus on the effect of global value chain participation, in 
particular offshoring from advanced to emerging economies based on global input-output 
tables. The use of industry-level data allows us to distinguish the impact on workers of different 
skill groups within manufacturing and service industries. We find that integration into global 
value chains with advanced economies reduces the labour share in emerging economies, in 
both manufacturing and service industries, particularly for medium-skilled workers. Global 
value chain participation increases productivity, but it also reduces the bargaining power of 
labour and allows firms to charge a higher markup, leading to a decline in the labour share. In 
contrast, higher union density and government consumption spending increase the labour 
share. Labour in emerging economies loses out as production becomes more integrated across 
borders. Our results indicate that reversing the fall in the labour share requires changes in labour 
market institutions and fiscal policies to improve the bargaining power of labour. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The share of labour income in GDP has declined globally since the 1980s. Previous research 
provides evidence that the labour share in advanced economies declined due to global value 
chains (GVCs) and in particular the offshoring of production to emerging economies (Elsby et 
al., 2013; Guschanski and Onaran, 2021). The flipside of these trade relations, i.e. the impact 
of GVCs on workers in emerging economies, has received less attention. International policy 
institutions frequently highlight GVCs as pathways for development and technological 
upgrading in emerging economies (World Bank, 2020; WTO, 2013), while traditional trade 
theory based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests that low-skilled workers in labour-
abundant Global South countries will benefit from trade with the Global North. Nevertheless, 
there is mounting evidence of workers’ rights abuses along GVCs between advanced and 
emerging economies, implying that potential gains from productivity are not equally shared 
(ILO, 2016; Selwyn and Leyden, 2021). This has prompted the introduction of a law that 
pushes producers in France to prevent human rights abuses along their supply chains. A similar 
law is currently under discussion at the level of the European Union and Germany (Emons et 
al., 2021).  
We contribute to these debates by conducting an econometric analysis of the 
determinants of the labour share in seven emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, South Korea, Turkey)1, with a focus on the effect of GVC participation. Previous 
econometric studies on emerging economies use country-level data and usually pool advanced 
and emerging economies. This article is the first to estimate the determinants of the labour 
share for a sample of emerging economies at the industry level. This is important for three 
reasons: firstly, a separate analysis for emerging economies is necessary to capture the effect 
of offshoring from the Global North to the Global South. Secondly, disaggregation at the 
industry level allows us to obtain a detailed measure of GVC participation using international 
input-output tables, and differentiate results by high-, medium-, and low-skilled workers within 
manufacturing and service industries. This is relevant not only because GVCs are concentrated 
in manufacturing industries, but also because the impact of GVC integration is likely to vary 
for workers of different skill groups. Thirdly, most previous research uses country-level data, 
which conflates a decline in the labour share within industries and a reallocation towards 
industries with a lower labour share. We focus on the former process, which was highlighted 
 
1 The country sample and estimation period are determined by data availability as discussed in more 
detail in Section 4. 
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as the main driver of the decline in the labour share in emerging (and advanced) economies 
(Dao et al., 2019). Thereby, we can abstract from changes in the industrial composition, which 
are prompted by the shrinking of the agricultural industry and are arguably less influenced by 
GVC participation.  
The theoretical contribution of this article is to provide a simple framework that 
analyses the impact of GVC participation on the labour share. In doing so, we synthesize 
economic literature on functional income distribution with literature in development studies on 
industrial and social upgrading. In particular, we discern two channels via which GVC 
integration impacts the labour share: first, productivity in emerging economies rises as 
advanced economies offshore capital-intensive tasks to emerging economies as well as due to 
trade-induced technological change (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012; Elsby et al., 2013; 
Lian, 2019). This process, which we label the ‘productivity channel’, can reduce the labour 
share. Second, integration into GVCs is often accompanied by changes in working conditions 
and higher markup power of firms (Barrientos et al., 2011; De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012; 
Lund-Thomsen et al., 2012). The resulting decline in labour’s bargaining power and the rise in 
the markup can also lower the labour share. We label this the ‘bargaining channel’. Previous 
economic literature on the impact of GVCs on the labour share in emerging economies has 
focused on the first channel, whereas power relations between capital and labour are notably 
absent from the discussion (Dao et al., 2019; Lian, 2019; Reshef and Santoni, 2019).2 This 
mirrors literature in development studies on industrial upgrading, which analyses productivity 
gains as firms move up the GVC (Bair and Gereffi, 2001; Gereffi, 2009). Contrariwise, power 
relations along GVCs are discussed under the concept of social upgrading. Social upgrading 
has recently been linked to industrial upgrading (Barrientos et al., 2011; Gereffi and Lee, 2016), 
but both concepts have not been integrated with the economics literature on the labour share. 
Our theoretical framework is a first attempt at this synthesis, which introduces a political 
economy perspective on the effect of GVCs on bargaining power to the debate within 
economics.  
We analyse the bargaining and productivity channels empirically using a detailed 
industry-level dataset that spans the 1995-2014 period. Our findings suggest that the labour 
 
2 GVC participation and offshoring has been linked to bargaining power in the context of advanced 
economies, but not for emerging economies (Guschanski and Onaran, 2021). A related literature 
analyses the effect of general trade openness, measured by imports plus exports as a ratio to GDP, and 
FDI on the bargaining power of labour vis-à-vis capital and there is evidence of a negative effect on the 
labour share (Harrison, 2002; Jayadev, 2007; Onaran, 2009; Rodrik, 1998). However, our focus is on 
GVCs, which is a narrower concept.  
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share was negatively impacted by GVCs through a reduction in labour’s bargaining power, 
consistent with the bargaining channel. This effect is particularly strong for medium-skilled 
workers in manufacturing industries, although it is also apparent in service industries. While 
we also find some evidence for the productivity channel, the results are not robust across 
different specifications and estimation methodologies.  
GVC participation has only recently gained prominence in the growing literature on the 
decline in the labour share, while previous research focuses on two different explanations: 
technological change and labour market institutions. Most prominently, Karabarbounis and 
Neiman (2014) argue that technological change led to a reduction in the relative price of capital 
and a subsequent increase in capital intensity, which contributed to a decline in the labour share 
in advanced as well as emerging economies. Other studies find supporting (Doan and Wan, 
2017) as well as contradicting evidence (Harrison, 2002). More recently, Dao et al. (2019) 
show that the reduction in the relative price of capital had negligible effects on the labour share 
in emerging economies. Several empirical analyses have confirmed a positive impact of labour 
market institutions such as minimum wages and government consumption on the labour share 
in emerging economies, suggesting that labour’s position improves if they can rely on the fall-
back option of a social wage (ILO, 2011; Jayadev, 2007; Onaran, 2009; Stockhammer, 2017). 
Studies on advanced economies have also highlighted the positive impact of union density 
(ILO, 2011; Stockhammer, 2017) and the relevance of labour laws (Damiani et al., 2018; 
Deakin et al., 2014), but analyses for emerging economies are lacking. While some of these 
articles provide separate results for emerging economies (Doan and Wan, 2017; Harrison, 
2002; Onaran, 2009; Stockhammer, 2017), none uses industry-level data except Karabarbounis 
and Neiman (2014).  
Among the studies that account for GVC participation, Dao et al. (2019) and Reshef 
and Santoni (2019) use industry-level data and are most closely related to our analysis. Both 
articles provide evidence of a negative impact of GVC participation in a pool of advanced and 
emerging economies. Dao et al. (2019) show that this is driven by a reduction in the labour 
income of medium-skilled workers. These findings are explained by an increasing share of 
tasks with low elasticity of substitution and a simultaneous increase in capital intensity, in line 
with the productivity channel. None of these articles conducts separate analyses for emerging 
economies. Furthermore, they do not control for the destination of exports, whereas the 
theoretical channels emphasise GVCs between emerging and advanced economies, rather than 
South-South trade driving the effects. Additionally, while both studies control for the relative 
price of capital at the country level, none controls for capital intensity directly. Therefore, they 
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cannot assess the different channels outlined above, as their estimated effect of GVC 
participation might be a result of changes in the bargaining power of labour or an increase in 
capital intensity.3 Our analysis not only confirms these findings using more detailed industry-
level data but also sheds light on the exact mechanism underlying the decline in the labour 
share, which is based on a reduction in the bargaining power of labour and an increase in the 
markup.   
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents stylised facts on the 
labour share and its determinants, GVC participation, capital intensity and labour market 
institutions. Section 3 describes the relationship between the labour share, industrial and social 
upgrading, as well as a theoretical framework illustrating the two channels via which GVCs 
impact the labour share, differentiating workers of different skill groups. Section 4 presents our 
data, econometric model and methodology, and Section 5 presents econometric estimation 
results for the labour share as well as productivity, real wages, and capital intensity. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
STYLISED FACTS 
While the global decline in the aggregate country-level labour share is a well-documented fact, 
there is only limited analysis at the industry level, particularly for emerging economies. We 
find that the aggregate trend is mirrored at the sectoral level, albeit with differences between 
manufacturing and services industries as well as high- (HS) and low-skill (LS) industry groups 
(Figure 1).  
 
<Figure 1> 
 
During our sample period 1995-2014, the country-level labour share followed a U-shaped 
pattern in Brazil, China, and India, while there is a secular decline in Indonesia and South 
Korea (henceforth Korea). In Turkey and Mexico, the currency crises in the early 2000s mark 
a new phase of decline in the labour share following a brief period of recovery after the 1994 
currency crises. The years shortly after the 2007 financial crisis show a temporary increase in 
the labour share in all countries. Profits decline faster than wages in recessions because wages 
 
3 Lian (2019) reports a negative correlation of trade intensity (imports plus exports) and the labour share 
at the industry level, but does not measure GVC integration and does not control for other variables. 
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are often set by long-term contracts, thus leading to a temporary increase in the labour share 
during recessions.  
Turning to the industry level, the labour share declined in half (48%) of all industries 
between 1995 and 2014. Moreover, 85% of those industries where the labour share decreased, 
experienced a decline of more than 3%-points  between 1995 and 2014. The similar dynamics 
between industry and country-level labour shares confirm previous findings from shift-share 
analyses that attribute the decline of the country-level labour share to a decline within industries 
(Dao et al 2019; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). The decline is most pronounced across 
countries in low-skilled manufacturing sectors like ‘Basic and Fabricated Metals’, ‘Food, 
Beverages and Tobacco’, and high-skilled sectors like ‘Chemical Products’. Several low-
skilled service sectors such as ‘Wholesale’ and ‘Retail Trade’ as well as ‘Construction’ were 
equally affected and there is also evidence of a decline in high-skilled service sectors like 
‘Financial Intermediation’.  
To assess the development of GVC participation, Figure 2 shows intra-industry 
intermediate exports from emerging economies to high-income countries (including Australia, 
Canada, Europe, Japan, Russia, and the USA) as a share of gross output. This measure captures, 
for example, exports from the textile industry in Mexico, which are used as intermediate inputs 
in the textile industry in the USA. Our measure is closely related to forward linkages in GVCs, 
which are defined as the share of exports consisting of intermediate inputs used by trading 
partners for production of their exports to third countries (Dao, et al. 2019), but captures the 
offshoring process more precisely as we only consider trade within the same industry across 
countries.   
 
<Figure 2> 
 
Exports of intra-industry intermediate products are concentrated in manufacturing industries, 
even though some countries, such as India, experience substantial growth of high-skill service 
exports. At the country level, the share of exports increased until 2007. The only exception is 
Korea, which experienced an overall decline in the export share of intermediate goods, and 
Indonesia, where exports are highly volatile and declined by a negligible 3% between 1995 and 
2007. While most countries experienced a decline in exports for several years following the 
2007 financial crisis, the positive trend has resumed since 2009. One exception is China, which 
has stagnating export shares since the Great Recession.   
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At first glance, data for most countries confirm opposing patterns pre-2007, with 
increasing participation in GVCs and a declining labour share. The dynamics post-2007 are 
more variable and country-specific but are largely characterised by increasing intermediate 
exports and stagnating labour shares.  
Aside from GVC participation, capital intensity and labour market institutions have 
been put forward as determinants of the labour share. Figure 3 plots capital intensity, measured 
by the capital stock as a ratio to value added.   
 
<Figure 3> 
 
Interestingly, capital intensity shows a similar pattern to the labour share, with a marked decline 
until 2007, and a slight increase thereafter in most countries. Ostensibly, this contrasts with 
explanations for the decline in the labour share based on an increase in capital intensity.  
Lastly, Figure 4 plots union density at the country level for our sample. Union density 
is one of the most commonly used institutional measures of bargaining power. However, the 
expected effects will depend on the wider institutional and political framework and might 
differ, for example, between progressive and conservative or authoritarian political regimes.  
 
<Figure 4> 
 
Overall, countries experienced a decline in trade union density, except for Indonesia, where 
union density increases between 1995 and 2001, followed by a secular decline. This is in line 
with the argument linking the decline in the labour share to a fall in the relative bargaining 
power of labour.  
 
THE LABOUR SHARE IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
This section discusses the effects of GVC participation on functional income distribution in 
emerging economies within the context of industrial and social upgrading. Industrial upgrading 
examines how “nations, firms, and workers move from low-value to relatively high-value 
activities in global production networks” (Gereffi, 2005: 171). Social upgrading looks at wages 
and working conditions throughout the process of GVC integration (Barrientos et al. 2011). 
While these rich literature streams cover a variety of factors, two implications stand out: 
industrial upgrading involves increases in productivity, whereas social upgrading is 
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accompanied by increases in the real wage. Labour productivity and the real wage, in turn, 
determine the labour share, (𝑆), which is average real wages (𝑤𝑟) times hours worked (𝐿) 
divided by value added (𝑌). 𝑆 can equally be written as the ratio of real wages and labour 
productivity (𝑦), where  
 
𝑆 =
𝑤𝑟×𝐿
𝑌
=
𝑤𝑟
𝑌/𝐿
=
𝑤𝑟
𝑦
  (1) 
 
Transforming the equation to growth rates yields 
 
?̂? = ?̂?𝑟 − ?̂?   (2) 
 
Thus, the labour share declines (increases) when real wages grow less (more) than labour 
productivity. The next subsection focuses first on industrial upgrading and the effect of GVCs 
on productivity, and subsequently on social upgrading and the real wage. The following 
subsection presents a simple theoretical framework to pin down the different channels via 
which GVC participation impacts the labour share. 
 
Industrial upgrading and productivity; social upgrading and the real wage 
As firms from advanced economies offshore parts of their production to emerging economies, 
the latter can experience productivity increases. There are two main reasons. First, firms in 
emerging economies might get access to more advanced technology that allows to automate 
part of the production process or organise it more efficiently (referred to as process upgrading, 
Barrientos et al. 2011). Second, while firms in emerging economies often start with the 
production of low-technology products, they can successfully move towards more 
sophisticated goods. Sophisticated products often require a more educated workforce and 
advanced machinery and are thus associated with higher labour productivity by the very nature 
of their production process (referred to as functional upgrading, Barrientos et al. 2011). For 
example, exporting firms in Mexico’s textile industry successfully expanded the spectrum of 
activities from only assembly in 1993, to a variety of higher value-added production steps, 
including cutting, laundry and finishing, in 2000 (Bair and Gereffi, 2001). Strategies aimed at 
industrial upgrading are often referred to as the ‘high road’ to competitiveness. There are, 
however, examples of producers who follow a path of industrial downgrading. As the main 
reason for the offshoring of production to emerging economies are lower labour costs, some 
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actors prefer to stay, or even move down, the GVC, to focus on low value-added activities. 
This is referred to as the ‘low road’ to competitiveness, and, as price competition is fierce, it is 
often accompanied by squeezing wages and failure to abide by social or environmental laws 
(Bair and Gereffi, 2001; Lund-Thomsen et al., 2012).  
While productivity increases are often seen as a precondition for increases in the real 
wage, it depends on workers’ bargaining power whether higher real wages are actually 
achieved. Participation in GVCs can open up new employment opportunities and increase the 
demand for labour. A tighter labour market is usually associated with stronger bargaining 
power of labour and higher wages in standard economic models. Conversely, literature on 
social upgrading has highlighted how participation in GVCs disrupts existing labour relations, 
with negative consequences for the bargaining power of labour. Aspects that are highlighted 
include outsourcing of employment, non-standard production locations and restrictions in 
labour rights. Evidence suggests that suppliers of big multinational companies rely on contract 
and agency labour. Workers hired through subcontractors are more likely to be subject to low 
(below minimum) wages, forced overtime, and higher production targets. An ITGLWF (2011) 
report based on interviews in 83 factories in the textile industry (of which 18 are situated in 
Indonesia, a country in our sample) found that agency workers were paid up to 15% lower 
wages than permanent workers, and that they were impeded from joining trade unions, lest 
their contract be terminated. Subcontracting is similarly spread in India and China (ILO, 2016; 
Lund-Thomsen et al., 2012). Additionally, to accommodate the increasing and volatile demand 
of international buyers, companies shift production from factories to workers’ homes or 
temporary work centres.4 Lund-Thomsen et al. (2012) compare the evolution of work 
conditions in India, Pakistan, and China, and find that Chinese workers are more frequently 
employed in factories, whereas Indian workers often work in centres or from home. They argue 
that factory-based production allows workers to organise and instigate strikes more easily, 
whereas outsourcing to centre- and home-based locations reduces wages and increases income 
and occupational insecurity. Lastly, exporting firms in general and GVCs in particular are often 
regulated by special laws to guarantee international competitiveness. For example, Korea had 
strict restrictions on union activity to achieve export targets during the 1990s (Seguino, 1997). 
Similarly, Turkey’s labour unions faced tough restrictions on strike activities in the name of 
 
4 The volatile nature of demand by multinational corporations was highlighted during the Covid-19 
pandemic, as many international buyers cancelled orders and refused to pay for goods that have already 
been produced. Consequently, many workers were made redundant, often without severance pay 
(Anner, 2020). 
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gaining international competitiveness after the conservative Justice and Development Party 
won the elections in 2002 (Onaran and Oyvat, 2016). Such policies could result in stagnating 
wages despite continuous industrial upgrading. 
Summing up, the effect of GVC participation on real wages and productivity is 
ambiguous and depends on the bargaining power of labour, as well as whether firms follow a 
‘high-road’ strategy. Appendix A1 shows that 70% of industries in our sample experienced an 
increase in both labour productivity and real wages, being consistent with simultaneous 
industrial and social upgrading. Nevertheless, in roughly half (48%) of all industries, the real 
wage increased less than labour productivity, implying that labour lost out relative to capital. 
More strikingly, in 13% of industries that experienced increasing labour productivity, the real 
wage declined, indicating that labour lost out not only in relative but also in absolute terms. 
 
The impact of GVCs on the labour share: a simple framework 
Based on the literature on industrial and social upgrading, we now provide a more formal 
treatment of the different channels via which GVC participation affects the labour share. We 
present a reduced form equation that defines the labour share as a function of capital intensity, 
technological change, bargaining power and the markup. Subsequently, we discuss how GVC 
participation impacts these variables. Industrial upgrading shifts capital intensity and induces 
technological change, which would be reflected in rising labour productivity. Equivalently, 
social upgrading impacts the real wage via bargaining power and the markup.  
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) show that under the assumption of a differentiable 
production function with constant returns to scale, but allowing for imperfect competition on 
the labour and goods market, the labour share (𝑆) can be expressed as a function of the capital-
output ratio (𝑘), capital-augmenting technological change (𝐴), the markup on labour costs (𝑚) 
and a parameter capturing the bargaining power of labour (𝛾). 
 
𝑆 = 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑘, 𝑚, 𝛾)  (3) 
 
Some previous studies use the constant elasticity of substitution production function (e.g. 
Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014). Following Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) we adopt a more 
general multiplicative functional form: 
 
𝑆 = 𝐴𝛽1𝑘𝛽1𝑒𝛽2𝑚+𝛽3𝛾   (4) 
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where the parameter 𝛽1 will be negative iff the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour is above one (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). If the elasticity is below one,  𝛽1 will be 
positive. Note that the effect of 𝑘 and 𝐴 on 𝑆 should be the same, although the coefficient in 
empirical estimations might differ due to different measures of the variables (Bassanini and 
Manfredi, 2014). Naturally, 𝛽2 is negative as profits increase when firms can charge a higher 
markup on labour costs, whereas 𝛽3 is positive because an increase in bargaining power allows 
labour to capture a larger share of profits. GVC participation can impact each of those variables 
and even parameters. An increase in 𝑘 and 𝐴 would increase productivity (productivity 
channel), and can thus be associated with industrial upgrading, whereas changes in 𝑚 and 𝛾 
would change the real wage (bargaining channel), and are thus related to social upgrading. We 
will now discuss this in more detail.  
 
The productivity channel 
Firms in advanced economies offshore tasks to emerging economies to benefit from lower 
wages (Dao et al., 2019). Elsby, et al. (2013) argue that offshored tasks, while being relatively 
labour intensive in advanced economies, can be considered capital intensive in emerging 
economies, which would imply that offshoring increases capital intensity (𝑘) in emerging 
economies. An increase in capital intensity is often associated with the production of higher 
value-added products and is thus related to the process of functional upgrading. It will reduce 
the labour share if the elasticity of substitution is above 1 (𝛽1 < 0).  
Lian (2019) provides further evidence for the argument raised by Elsby et al. (2013) in 
a two-country model. He shows that it would be rational for Global South countries to 
specialise in tasks with a low elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. In the context 
of declining prices of capital relative to labour (due to technological change) and declining 
offshoring costs, Global North countries will offshore tasks with a low elasticity of substitution 
(relative to other tasks in the North) to the South. The consequences are similar to Elsby et al. 
(2013) and imply increasing capital intensity and declining labour shares in emerging 
economies. Additionally, this process can also contribute to the increase of tasks with high 
elasticity of substitution in low-wage countries. If this hypothesis holds, we should expect a 
decline in parameter 𝛽1, in addition to the increase in 𝑘.  
GVC participation can also give firms in emerging economies access to new 
technologies, thus leading to trade-induced technological change or “learning by exporting” 
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(De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012). If technological change is capital-augmenting, this will 
increase 𝐴, and reduce the labour share if capital is a substitute for labour. This is consistent 
with process upgrading, which states that productivity increases through participation in GVCs. 
Notably, an increase in 𝑘 or 𝐴 would be reflected in increasing labour productivity, ceteris 
paribus. A negative effect of both processes is contingent on a specific parameter restriction – 
an elasticity of substitution between capital and labour above one.   
 
The bargaining channel 
GVC participation has been associated with outsourcing of workers and restrictions of labour 
rights. As the share of workers with lower-than-average bargaining power increases (a decline 
in 𝛾), the labour share declines. Conversely, if newly hired workers were previously 
unemployed, the bargaining power of labour can increase due to a tightening of the labour 
market. Overall, the effect is ambiguous. Many emerging economies face structural changes 
that imply a declining labour demand in the agricultural industry and subsequently excess 
labour supply as displaced agricultural workers pour into manufacturing and service jobs. In 
such a situation, the impact of GVCs is likely to be negative, as the negative effect on the 
bargaining power of workers will outweigh the negligible positive effect from a tightening of 
the labour market.5 
While the price-setting power of firms is not usually discussed in the literature on social 
upgrading, the markup can be seen as one of the variables capturing the bargaining power 
between capital and labour. Firms rarely impose nominal wage cuts. Instead, when their 
relative bargaining power rises, they increase prices while keeping wages constant, thus 
effectively raising the markup on their nominal unit production costs. As firms enter (or move 
up) the GVC, they often start producing goods that are more sophisticated than those produced 
for the domestic market. Sophisticated products, in turn, facilitate product differentiation and 
thus face a lower price sensitivity of demand (in absolute terms). Additionally, as production 
requires more complex technology, there are fewer competitors for these goods (Sutton and 
Trefler, 2016). Both factors allow to increase the markup.6 De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) 
show that these effects are particularly relevant for exporting firms. Kruger et al. (2017) 
 
5 Several authors suggested that GVC integration has led to increased competitive pressure among 
suppliers, which subsequently become less accommodating in wage negotiation and attempt to squeeze 
wages (Anner, 2020; Milberg, 2004; Onaran, 2009). However, the argument lacks an explanation for 
the reduction in the bargaining power of labour, which is a necessary condition for the wage squeeze to 
be successful.  
6 The markup is a negative function of the price elasticity of demand in models of imperfect competition.  
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provide evidence that Chinese and Mexican firms increased the markup as a consequence of 
the increasing sophistication of their exports.7  
Additionally, as suppliers in emerging economies establish trade relations with 
advanced countries, they might be able to cut out brokers or trading companies, thus reducing 
the costs for suppliers. Bair and Gereffi (2001) present evidence for the Textile industry in 
Mexico. Whether the cost reduction is used to increase the profit share, thus being equivalent 
to an increase in the markup, shared with labour, which would leave the labour share 
unchanged, or used to reduce product prices, thus increasing the labour share, will depend on 
the price elasticity of demand and the bargaining power of labour. However, in the context of 
suppressed labour unions and the absence of worker representatives on company boards, which 
characterises a significant share of production in our sample, workers are unlikely to be 
informed of such developments and will hardly react by increasing their wage demands, thus 
making a rise in the markup the most likely outcome.  
 
Skills and GVC participation 
The channels discussed above have different implications for workers of different skill groups. 
Whether an increase in capital intensity (𝑘) or technological progress (𝐴) reduces the labour 
share depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour. Low- and medium-
skilled labour is usually assumed to be easily substitutable, whereas high-skilled labour is 
complementary to capital. Thus, we would expect a negative effect of 𝑘 and 𝐴 on the former, 
and a positive effect on the latter. GVC participation might also affect the bargaining power of 
different skill groups differently. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) suggest that offshoring increases 
wages for high-skilled workers in advanced as well as emerging economies since tasks that are 
considered low-skill intensive in advanced countries are high-skill intensive in emerging 
economies. Such a shift in demand for high-skilled labour might reduce the bargaining power 
of low- and medium-skilled vis-à-vis high-skilled workers. Consequently, GVC participation 
might increase the labour share of high-skilled labour, while reducing the labour share for 
lower-skilled workers. The effect might be particularly strong for medium-skilled workers, as 
low-skilled workers rarely participate in GVC, which increasingly require higher skill levels 
 
7 In standard economic models an increase in the markup would imply a loss in competitiveness, which 
could have a negative effect on the profit share. However, the increase in the industry-level markup in 
this argument is a consequence of changing the composition of products, by increasing the share of 
sophisticated products that allow to charge a higher markup. While this increases the industry-level 
price index, it does not necessarily lead to a loss in competitiveness.  
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as firms move up the GVC. The overall effect on the labour share depends on whether the 
former or latter effect dominates,  which is contingent on the composition of the workforce and 
the elasticities of substitution between high- and low-skilled labour and capital.8 
 
Our hypotheses are summarised in Table 1. GVC participation can lead to industrial upgrading, 
which will be reflected in rising capital intensity and accelerated technological progress 
through “learning by exporting” (column 1) and consequently a rise in labour productivity 
(column 2). The effect on high-skilled workers is likely to be positive (column 4) since their 
elasticity of substitution is below one. The opposite holds for low- and medium-skilled workers 
(column 5). If GVCs reduce bargaining power and increase the markup as highlighted in the 
literature on social upgrading (column 1) the real wage will decline (column 3). Nevertheless, 
there might be different effects on high- and lower-skilled labour as GVC integration is likely 
to raise the demand for skilled workers (column 4), while low- and medium-skilled labour is 
likely to experience the effects of lower bargaining power more strongly. 
 
<Table 1> 
 
We analyse the empirical evidence for these channels in the next section.  
  
 
8 Figure A2 in the appendix presents the labour compensation of high-, medium- and low-skilled 
workers (as defined by their level of education) as a ratio to total value added. While the share of high 
skilled workers’ wage bill in value added increased in some countries, the picture is dominated by 
declining labour shares of both medium- and low-skilled workers, in line with different effects across 
skill groups. 
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DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
Our empirical model follows equation (4) (in logarithms) and mirrors standard econometric 
approaches to estimating labour share determinants (Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014; Bentolila 
and Saint-Paul, 2003; Doan and Wan, 2017). As there are no direct measures of the markup 
and bargaining power, we include their determinants (GVC participation and labour market 
institutions, 𝐿𝑀𝐼) directly in the estimation equation: 
 
ln(𝑆𝑐,𝑖,𝑡) = Σj=1
3  𝛼1j ln 𝑆𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−j + 𝛼2 ln 𝑘𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3 ln 𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4 ln 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛼5 ln 𝑋𝑅𝑐,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
 
where 𝑐, 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote country, industry, and year, and 𝜀 is the error term. 𝑆 is the adjusted 
labour share, measured as labour compensation as a ratio to value added based on the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD; Timmer, et al., 2015).9 WIOD relies, where available, on 
labour force surveys to estimate labour income of self- and informally-employed workers in 
emerging economies. In contrast to the static model in equation (4), we use a dynamic model, 
in line with the sluggish adjustment of our variables.10 We also estimate separate specifications 
for the share of the labour compensation of high-, medium- and low-skilled workers in sectoral 
value added. Low-, medium- and high-skilled refers to workers with primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education, respectively (Timmer, et al., 2015).  
𝑘 is the capital stock as a ratio to value added. It would be desirable to include a measure 
of capital-augmenting technological change. However, (imperfect) proxies like total factor 
productivity or the information and communication technology capital stock are not available 
for our sample. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) provide evidence that the potential bias 
resulting from the omission of this variable is negligible.  
 
9 The choice of countries and time period is determined by data availability. Unfortunately, WIOD ends 
in 2014, and no new data has been released. We link data across two different releases of WIOD by 
splicing, which required aggregation of some industries. A detailed industry list is provided in Table 
A3 in the appendix. We exclude the following industries from all estimations: Agriculture, Hunting, 
Forestry and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Coke and Refined Petroleum, as well as mostly publicly 
owned sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human 
Health and Social Work Activities). This is because wage setting in these industries may not be 
determined by the same forces as in other industries. Furthermore, we exclude the real estate sector 
whose value added largely constitutes imputed rents. We exclude outlier industries where the 
percentage change in the labour share exceeds 50% in one year or where the labour share is constant 
for the whole period, as this suggests data or classification issues (six industries in total from Brazil, 
China, Indonesia and Turkey).  
10 The estimation of a static model produces autocorrelated residuals. 
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We are mainly interested in the effect of offshoring of tasks from advanced economies 
on the labour share in emerging economies. In the baseline specification, we capture 𝐺𝑉𝐶 by 
intra-industry intermediate exports, based on WIOD. Furthermore, we differentiate exports by 
destination based on two country groups defined as ‘high-wage’ countries (Australia, Canada, 
Europe, Japan, Russia, and the USA), and ‘low-wage’ countries (including countries in our 
sample and the rest of the world). In alternative specifications, we also estimate the impact of 
total exports as a broad measure of trade openness, inward and outward FDI, offshoring 
(defined as inter-industry intermediate imports by using sector), and final imports by 
supplying-sector, all measured at the industry level.  
𝐿𝑀𝐼 refers to variables capturing industrial relations and labour market institutions, 
which will have an impact on the bargaining power of workers. We include union density at 
the country level in our baseline. We also test for the impact of country-level minimum wages 
as a ratio to sectoral average labour compensation per hours worked, government spending and 
an index of labour market institutions at the country level in alternative specifications. 
Additionally, financial globalisation, measured as exposure to international financial flows, 
was emphasised as a factor that can either impact the relative price of capital and subsequently 
𝑘 (Dao et al., 2019; Furceri et al., 2019), or the relative bargaining power of labour, 𝛾 (Jayadev, 
2007; Kohler et al., 2019). We account for this by including non-FDI flows as well as total 
foreign assets and liabilities at the country level in auxiliary specifications. 
Additionally, we control for the inverse of the nominal exchange rate (𝑋𝑅). Several 
studies highlighted the exchange rate as an important distributional variable in emerging 
economies (Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014; ILO, 2011; Onaran, 2009). Blecker (2012) argues 
that a currency depreciation induces a bargaining process between capital and labour. The 
impact on the labour share is ambiguous and depends on the relative bargaining power. An 
increase in 𝑋𝑅 indicates an appreciation of the domestic currency. 
To shed more light on the exact mechanism via which GVC participation impacts the 
labour share, we additionally conduct separate regressions using capital intensity, labour 
productivity and the real wage as dependent variables. According to the productivity channel, 
GVC participation should lead to increasing capital intensity or capital-augmenting 
technological change. To test the former we regress capital intensity on GVC participation: 
 
ln(𝑘𝑐,𝑖,𝑡) = ∑ 𝛽1j ln 𝑘𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
3
j=1 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ln 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ln 𝑋𝑅𝑐,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽5j ln 𝑤𝑟𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−j
2
j=0 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑖,𝑡  (6) 
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where 𝑤𝑟 is the real wage, measured as average labour compensation in real terms divided by 
hours worked of employees. We expect a positive impact of 𝐺𝑉𝐶 on 𝑘.  
As discussed above, we are not able to control for capital-augmenting technological 
change in our regression. Instead, making use of the fact that technological change would be 
reflected in rising labour productivity, we estimate the effect of GVC participation on labour 
productivity directly:  
 
ln(𝑦𝑐,𝑖,𝑡) = ∑ 𝜁1j ln 𝑦𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−j
3
j=1 + 𝜁2 ln 𝑘𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜁3 ln 𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜁4 ln 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜁5 ln 𝑋𝑅𝑐,𝑡 +
∑ 𝜁6j ln 𝑤𝑟𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−j
2
j=0 + 𝑣𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 (7) 
 
where 𝑦 is labour productivity, captured by value added per hours worked.  Again, we expect 
a positive impact of 𝐺𝑉𝐶.  
Finally, we estimate the real wage as 
 
ln(𝑤𝑟𝑐,𝑖,𝑡) = ∑ 𝜆1j ln 𝑤𝑟𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−j
3
j=1 + 𝜆2 ln 𝑘𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆3 ln 𝐺𝑉𝐶𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆4 ln 𝐿𝑀𝐼𝑐,𝑡 +
𝜆5 ln 𝑋𝑅𝑐,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆6j ln 𝑦𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
2
j=0 + 𝜖𝑐,𝑖,𝑡  (8) 
 
If GVC participation reduces the bargaining power of labour or increases the markup, the effect 
on the real wage would be negative. 
Variable definitions and data sources are listed in Table A4 in the appendix. 
 
If firms are optimising, 𝑘 is likely to be a function of past or current values of the labour 
share (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). Similarly, lower wages might lead to higher exports, 
thereby raising 𝐺𝑉𝐶. The bias arising when ignoring this problem of endogeneity in estimations 
could explain the finding of high and significant negative effects of technological change on 
the labour share in previous contributions, which do not properly account for endogeneity 
(Doan and Wan, 2017; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). The effect of GVC participation 
could be understated for the same reason. Our preferred approach is to use the difference-
General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
because it provides readily available ‘internal’ instruments based on lagged values of the 
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explanatory variables.11 Additionally, we conduct robustness tests using external instruments 
for 𝐺𝑉𝐶, based on the sum of intra-industry intermediate exports for a particular industry from 
all countries in our sample except the country-industry which is being instrumented. This 
approach mirrors previous studies on the effect of globalisation on labour markets (Autor et 
al., 2013),  but instead of relying on data from other regions, which is not available for our 
sample, we rely on data from the same industry in other countries. 𝐿𝑀𝐼 and 𝑋𝑅 are treated as 
exogenous. To achieve a dynamically complete model, which is a requirement for instrument 
validity in GMM, we start with the estimation of a fairly general autoregressive distributed lag 
model (ARDL), including the contemporaneous and lagged values of all explanatory variables 
and three lags of the dependent variable. Subsequently, we perform a ‘testing down’ procedure 
by dropping variables with the lowest t-statistic, until we are left with at least one measure per 
variable. This is the reason 𝐺𝑉𝐶 is used with a lag in the final estimations. Union density and 
the exchange rate enter in first differences, because we expect the change, rather than the level 
of those variables to impact distribution.12  
 
ESTIMATION RESULTS  
Specification (1) in Table 2 presents our baseline results. We start with estimations for 
manufacturing industries only, as these industries are the main drivers of GVC integration.  
 
<Table 2> 
 
We find a negative impact of intra-industry intermediate exports to high-wage countries 
(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐻𝑊), but no significant effect of exports to the rest of the world (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐿𝑊).13 
This confirms our hypothesis that participation in GVCs reduces the labour share and highlights 
the importance to distinguish between trade with high-wage countries and South-South trade. 
The coefficient indicates that an increase in the output share of intra-industry intermediate 
exports by 1% decreases the labour share by 0.17% in the short run, and 0.88% in the long-
run14. Capital intensity has a negative impact, albeit significant at the 10%-level only, which is 
 
11 As discussed below we also employ the system-GMM estimator to test for robustness. 
12 This is also confirmed by the ARDL estimation where the coefficients for the contemporaneous and 
lagged value have opposing signs and a Wald test indicates the same coefficient in absolute values. 
13 Validity tests indicate absence of autocorrelation in the residuals and instrument validity. 
14 Long-run coefficients are calculated by dividing the coefficients from specification (1) by one minus 
the sum of the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable. 
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consistent with an elasticity of substitution above one. We find a positive impact of union 
density reflecting unions’ importance for labour’s bargaining power. The effect of the exchange 
rate is positive and significant, suggesting that an appreciation has a positive impact on the 
labour share. The coefficients imply that a decline in capital intensity by 1%, an increase in the 
growth rate of union density by 1%, or an appreciation of the exchange rate by 1% increase the 
labour share, respectively, by 0.80%, 0.51% and 0.76% in the long-run.  
Estimations for service sectors in specification (2) confirm these results, but capital 
intensity now has a positive effect, whereas union density and the exchange rate turn 
statistically insignificant. The lack of robustness for our control variables indicates that 
determinants of the labour share, including the elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour, differ across manufacturing and service industries. Nevertheless, GVC participation 
decreases the labour share in both industry groups.  
Specification (3) reports results for manufacturing and services jointly. All variables 
except for union density turn statistically insignificant and the failure to reject the Hansen test 
of instrument validity and the relatively low AR2 test statistic indicate potential model 
misspecification. This is not particularly surprising given the results in specifications (1) and 
(2), which suggest that separate analyses for manufacturing and service industries are 
warranted. We focus our subsequent analysis on manufacturing industries. 
Specification (4) reproduces our baseline specification using the within-estimator rather 
than the GMM estimator, i.e. without instrumenting our covariates. Exports to high-wage 
countries remain statistically significant, albeit with a reduced coefficient, and exports to low-
wage countries are now significant with a negative impact as well. Capital intensity turns 
statistically insignificant with a positive sign. The remaining variables are robust and the 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable shows the expected downward bias in comparison 
to our baseline estimation. Overall, this confirms our choice of the difference-GMM estimator 
and implies that accounting for endogeneity is essential. 
The Great Recession had a strong impact on the labour market and bargaining relations 
and may distort the effect of underlying determinants of income distribution (Guschanski and 
Onaran, 2021). To account for this, we restrict our sample to the 1995-2007 period in 
specification (5). All variables, except for capital intensity which turns statistically 
insignificant, remain robust. 
Specifications (6-8) use labour compensation of high-, medium-, and low-skilled 
workers as a ratio to value added as the dependent variable. Data is limited to the 1995-2009 
period and we restrict our sample to end in 2007 to avoid the 2008 financial crisis and provide 
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comparability to specification (5).15 We include the share of people with the relevant level of 
education (𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒) as a control variable to account for the changing educational 
composition of the population. The negative effect of intra-industry intermediate exports to 
high-wage countries is only statistically significant for medium-skilled labour. It appears that 
medium-skilled workers are most strongly impacted by GVC participation. It is possible that 
low-skilled workers rarely participate in export production, which increasingly requires higher 
skill levels as firms move up the GVC. In contrast, high-skilled labour might be relatively more 
successful in extracting part of the productivity gains, due to stronger bargaining power and 
increased demand for their skills. Nevertheless, in contrast to Feenstra and Hansen (1996), we 
find no evidence that high-skilled workers gain from trade in intermediate products. While 
medium-skilled workers lose out the most, labour in aggregate loses out relatively to capital. 
We obtain a positive coefficient for capital intensity for all three skill groups, in line with the 
overall positive effect in specification (5), which captures the same period. The effect is 
statistically significant only for high-skilled workers, which indicates a particularly low 
elasticity of substitution in line with expectations that high-skilled labour has a strong 
complementarity with capital. However, it contradicts the idea that the labour share declined 
due to an increase in capital intensity, as medium- and low-skilled labour is still a complement 
for capital (as the coefficient is positive albeit insignificant) or technology-neutral (interpreting 
the coefficient as zero as it is insignificant). Union density displays a positive effect for 
medium- and low-skilled labour and a negative coefficient for high-skilled workers, although 
it is not statistically significant. However, results for specifications (6-8) have to be interpreted 
with caution as validity tests indicate potential model specification issues. Also, potential 
measurement issues related to informal employment might be particularly relevant for low-
skilled labour. 
Results in Table 2 indicate that GVC participation, in particular the supply of 
intermediate products to advanced economies, has reduced the labour share in emerging 
economies, predominantly by reducing labour income of medium-skilled workers. While the 
results hold for manufacturing as well as service industries, the effect on the former is stronger. 
GVC participation could have reduced the labour share through an increase in capital intensity 
 
15 Results are robust to estimations for the 1995-2009 period. While we keep the lag structure identical 
to the baseline, results are also robust to the exclusion of the third lagged dependent variable, which is 
insignificant for medium- and low-skilled workers. Estimations for service industries yield similar 
results although exports turn statistically insignificant while maintaining their negative coefficient for 
low- and medium-skilled labour. Results are available upon request. 
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in manufacturing industries, but not in service industries where an increase in capital intensity 
would increase the labour share. Furthermore, the negative effect of capital intensity is not 
robust across different specifications and seems to be relevant only from 2008 onwards. The 
insignificant coefficient in specification (5) further indicates that the elasticity of substitution 
has increased over time, consistent with the mechanism proposed by Lian (2019). Most 
importantly, we find a negative coefficient for 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐻𝑊, despite controlling for capital 
intensity. This implies that GVC participation impacts distribution either by contributing to 
(capital-augmenting) technological change, by increasing the markup or by reducing the 
bargaining power of labour. 
To compare the effects of different explanatory variables, equation (9) reports 
standardised coefficients based on specification (1) in Table 2. Standardised coefficients 
measure the effect of a one standard deviation change of the explanatory variables, thereby 
allowing comparison of the relative effect size of variables with different variances and units 
of measurement. Only statistically significant variables are reported.  
 
𝑆𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 = −0.331 𝑘𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 − 0.560 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐻𝑊𝑐,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 0.100 𝛥𝑈𝐷 + 0.155 𝛥𝑋𝑅𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑖,𝑡 (9) 
 
The results show that 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐻𝑊, our preferred measure of GVC participation, exerts the 
largest impact on the labour share among the explanatory variables. In particular, the effect is 
almost twice as large as that of capital intensity.   
We conduct a battery of robustness tests on our baseline specification, some of which 
are reported in Table A5 in the appendix. In specifications (1) and (2) we use external 
instruments based on exports of industries in other countries, as described in Section 4. In 
specification (1) we add these instruments as additional external instruments to our baseline 
specification. Specification (2) is based on a simpler and less-efficient two-stage least square 
(2-SLS) estimator and a more parsimonious model including only the lagged dependent 
variable, our export measures, and the exogenous regressors. In addition to the external 
instruments for exports to high- and low-wage countries, we instrument the lagged dependent 
variable with its own second and third lag to mitigate the Nickell-bias. Specifications (3-4) use 
the system-, rather than difference-GMM estimator, which employs additional moment 
conditions that can be applied to the model estimated in levels instead of differences. In 
specifications (5-6) we use the mean-group estimator to account for potential bias that might 
arise if the pooling assumption does not hold, i.e. when coefficients for different country-
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industries in our sample differ. This estimator circumvents the problem of parameter 
heterogeneity by conducting estimations separately for all country-specific industries and then 
averaging the coefficients. However, as it does not account for endogeneity (Pesaran et al., 
1999), the overall effect is an average of potentially biased coefficients. Specifications (7-8) 
apply weights to our baseline specification, which are based on the share of the respective 
industry in total value added.  
All estimations for manufacturing industries (specifications 1-3, 5 and 7) confirm our 
baseline results. In particular, when we employ external instruments, the coefficient for exports 
to high-wage countries is very similar in size to our baseline (-0.15 in specification 2, Table 
A5, vs -0.17 in specification 1, Table 2). This gives further support to our identification strategy 
and the GMM estimator.16  
The Hansen-test for instrument validity is not passed in specification (3), due to a low 
Incremental Hansen test on the instruments used in the level equation (p-value of 0.06). This 
negates the necessary condition for the applicability of the system-GMM estimator (so-called 
effect stationarity) and renders this estimation method unreliable, thereby confirming our 
choice of difference-GMM as our baseline estimation method. Capital intensity is only 
statistically significant in specification (5), where it has a positive effect on the labour share. 
This casts further doubt on the relevance of the productivity channel. Estimations for services 
do not yield statistically significant results except for specification (8) using the weighted-
GMM estimator, where we find a negative impact of 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐻𝑊, consistent with our 
baseline.  
In appendix Table A6 we report alternative model specifications. We measure GVC 
participation as total (rather than intra-industry) intermediate exports (𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠) in 
specification (1), add offshoring, measured as intra-industry intermediate imports in 
specification (2), and additionally final imports of consumption and capital goods in 
specification (3). Specifications (4) and (5) include inward and outward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) as alternative measures of GVC participation, but due to data availability our 
sample is restricted to Turkey and Korea. Specification (6) controls for non-FDI flows (mainly 
portfolio and debt flows) as a ratio to GDP at the country level. Specification (7-10) include 
additional measures of bargaining power, specifically total foreign assets plus liabilities 
(financial globalisation), an index of labour market legislation (Adams, et al., 2016), national 
 
16 Results are also robust when capital intensity is included in the 2-SLS estimation, using lags of capital 
intensity as its instruments.  
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minimum wages as a ratio to average labour compensation per worker, and total government 
consumption as a share of GDP. 
Results in Table A6 confirm our previous findings. There is a robust negative impact 
of GVC participation on the labour share in emerging economies, and this is consistent across 
alternative, albeit less precise, measures of GVCs, such as total exports of intermediate 
products (specification 1) and inward FDI (specification 4). However, the coefficient is smaller 
and statistically significant at the 10%-level only, suggesting that our narrow measure of intra-
industry intermediate exports to advanced economies is more relevant for income distribution 
than broader measures of trade exposure. Offshoring does not exercise a negative impact on 
the labour share in emerging economies (specifications 2-3), although there is evidence of a 
negative effect of outward FDI, an alternative measure of offshoring, on Turkey and Korea 
(specification 5). Turkey and Korea have the highest GDP per capita in our sample and thus a 
higher incentive to offshore production to countries with lower wages, which might explain the 
negative impact of outward FDI.  
Union density has a robust positive impact on the labour share, except for specifications 
(4-5) which are restricted to Turkey and Korea. As discussed in Section 3, suppression of union 
activity was a key feature of the strategy for industrial upgrading in both countries, which might 
explain this finding. We find no effect of non-FDI flows in specification (6), suggesting that 
trade flows are more important drivers of the labour share than financial flows. Similarly, there 
is no statistically significant effect of financial globalisation, labour market legislation or the 
minimum wage (specifications 7-9). In contrast, we find evidence of a positive effect of 
government consumption on the labour share in specification (10). Interpreting government 
consumption as a proxy for expenditure on social safety nets implies that labour’s bargaining 
power increases if workers can rely on the provision of basic services in case of job loss.17 
Capital intensity is not robust, turning statistically insignificant in six out of ten specifications 
in Table A6, casting further doubt on the relevance of this variable.  
To pin down the exact channel via which GVC participation impacts the labour share, 
we conduct estimations using capital intensity, labour productivity and the real wage as 
dependent variables. In light of our previous results, we expect to find that GVC participation 
increases labour productivity, or reduces the real wage, or both. However, either of those 
findings is sufficient to obtain a negative effect of GVCs on the labour share. Additionally, if 
 
17 Nevertheless, results can only be considered indicative because the Hansen-test is not passed. It would 
be desirable to use more detailed measures, such as public spending on social protection or health and 
education, which is unfortunately unavailable for our sample period. 
25 
GVCs reduce the labour share due to an increase in capital intensity, we expect a positive 
impact of intermediate exports on capital intensity. Table 3 presents the results.   
 
<Table 3> 
 
The dependent variable is capital intensity for specifications (1-3), labour productivity for 
specifications (4-6), and the real wage for specifications (7-9). Specifications (1), (4) and (7) 
in bold are restricted to manufacturing industries and are thus closely related to our baseline.  
Intra-industry intermediate exports do not have a statistically significant impact on 
capital intensity in either manufacturing or service industries according to specifications (1-3). 
Even though an increase in capital intensity reduces the labour share in manufacturing 
according to our previous findings in Table 2 specification (1), there is no evidence that GVC 
integration is a driver of capital intensity. This casts further doubt on the hypothesis that GVCs 
impact the labour share via an increase in capital intensity.  
In contrast, we find a positive effect of 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 on labour productivity in 
manufacturing in specification (4), which is consistent with the hypothesis that GVC 
participation contributes to industrial upgrading, most likely via capital-augmenting 
technological change. There is no effect in service industries (specification 5) and consequently 
the variable is significant at the 10%-level only for the pool of all industries (specification 6). 
Results have to be taken with a grain of salt, as the Hansen test is not passed, and the AR2-test 
indicates autocorrelation in the residuals.  
Finally, we find a negative impact of GVCs on the real wage in specification (7) for 
manufacturing industries. In contrast to estimations for labour productivity (Specifications 4-
6), all validity tests are passed. The positive effect is limited to manufacturing industries only, 
as estimations for services and total industries show a negative, albeit statistically insignificant 
coefficient.  
This suggests that the negative effect of GVC participation on the labour share is not 
only a consequence of increasing labour productivity, which is then not passed on to workers. 
Rather, our results show that the real wage would have been higher, for a given level of 
productivity, if firms would not have participated in GVCs. This lends further support to our 
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hypothesis that GVC participation allows firms to charge a higher markup, and/or reduces the 
bargaining power of labour.18  
We have conducted a variety of robustness tests on the specifications in Table 3. Results 
are robust to omitting capital intensity, which is statistically insignificant in all estimations. 
Similarly, results are robust to using the number of people engaged rather than hours worked 
by employees to calculate real wages and labour productivity. 19  
 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis implies that globalisation decreased the bargaining power of labour vis-à-vis 
capital and reduced the labour share in emerging economies. More specifically, we find that 
the integration into GVCs is an important driver of this process, which has particularly affected 
medium-skilled workers. An increase in intra-industry intermediate exports to advanced 
economies by 1% decreases the labour share in emerging economies by 0.88% on average. We 
show that the effect is driven by offshoring from advanced to emerging economies rather than 
South-South trade, and apparent in manufacturing as well as service industries. However, our 
results cast doubt on the channel proposed by previous research, which posits that the labour 
share declined as a consequence of increasing capital intensity (Dao et al., 2019; Elsby et al., 
2013). While we find some evidence of a negative effect of capital intensity on the labour share, 
the result is not robust across different specifications and estimation methodologies. 
Furthermore, GVC participation does not increase capital intensity according to our findings. 
There is more evidence consistent with trade-induced technological change through “learning 
by exporting” (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012) and process-upgrading, since GVCs increase 
labour productivity. Yet, productivity gains are not shared with labour.  
We outline two possible explanations for this finding: first, as discussed in the literature 
on social upgrading, GVC participation has reduced the bargaining power of labour due to 
increased use of outsourcing and the setting up of temporary production sites. Second, as 
evidenced in the economics literature on markup power, moving up the GVC allows firms to 
produce more sophisticated goods with lower price elasticity and a lower degree of 
competition. This permits to charge a higher markup, subsequently reducing the labour share. 
Our econometric analysis confirms these processes. In addition to reducing the labour share, 
 
18 In relation to our mapping of industries in appendix A1, this finding suggests that GVC participation 
pushes industries towards a process of increasing labour productivity and declining real wages, rather 
than a case where both productivity and real wages increase.   
19 Data on hours worked is not available for China, which is dropped from our sample in Table 3.  
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we find that GVC participation directly reduces real wages, thus providing further support for 
the effect of GVCs on the bargaining power and the markup.  
Aside from GVCs, the fall in the labour share is due to a strong deterioration in union 
density. In contrast, government consumption increases the bargaining power of labour, while 
labour market institutions and gross financial flows were not statistically significant.  
These results have implications for research and policy. The effect of GVC integration 
on bargaining power has so far not been analysed in the economic literature on the labour share 
in emerging economies, as opposed to research on the labour share in advanced economies 
(Guschanski and Onaran, 2021). Literature in development studies has more successfully 
integrated the impact of GVC participation on productivity on the one hand and bargaining 
power on the other hand, in a synthetic analysis of industrial and social upgrading (e.g. 
Barrientos et al., 2011). However, these contributions have not included the impact of GVCs 
on the markup power of firms, which is prominent in the economic literature, and would enrich 
the debate in development studies. Empirical research on advanced economies has highlighted 
that part of the decline in the labour share is driven by increasing concentration within 
industries (Autor et al., 2017). As firms benefitting from GVCs are usually large (World Bank, 
2020), this process might also be relevant for emerging economies. Future research could use 
firm-level data to test this empirically.   
Previous contributions have shown that offshoring from advanced to emerging 
economies puts downward pressure on the labour share in advanced economies (Guschanski 
and Onaran, 2021), while this article indicates that workers in emerging economies, the hosts 
of the offshored tasks, are equally losing out relatively to capital. Trade integration can increase 
productivity, but policies should be in place to ensure that labour and capital can share the gains 
more equally. Equitable trade requires a level playing field between capital and labour, which 
can be achieved via an improvement in trade union legislation or the expansion of social safety 
nets. Supplier firms in emerging economies, while squeezing labour, are themselves subject to 
severe price competition and profit squeeze by buyer firms in advanced economies (Anner, 
2020). Regulations that hold firms in advanced economies responsible for working conditions 
along their value chain could help to address this issue and should be strengthened (World 
Bank, 2020). Finally, our results suggest that a simple attempt to increase the labour share 
through skill-upgrading will not be effective for improving equality, as medium-skilled 
workers have experienced the strongest negative impact of GVC participation.    
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1. Labour share by sector groups, 1995-2914 
 
 
Notes: ‘Total’ includes all industries. Industry-level graphs exclude: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; 
and Mining and Quarrying; Coke and Refined Petroleum; Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities and Real Estate. HS and LS stand for high- and 
low-skill industries, respectively.    
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD. 
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Figure 2. Intra-industry intermediate exports to advanced economies, 1995-2014 
 
Notes: ‘Total’ includes all industries. Industry-level graphs exclude: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; 
and Mining and Quarrying; Coke and Refined Petroleum; Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities and Real Estate. HS and LS stand for high- and 
low-skill industries, respectively.    
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD.  
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Figure 3. Capital intensity, 1995-2014  
 
 
Notes: ‘Total’ includes all industries. Industry-level graphs exclude: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; 
and Mining and Quarrying; Coke and Refined Petroleum; Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social 
Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work Activities and Real Estate. HS and LS stand for high- and 
low-skill industries, respectively.    
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD.  
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Figure 4. Trade union density, 1995-2014 
 
 
Notes: Data is linearly interpolated between available values. 
Source: ICTWSS (Visser, 2019).    
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Table 1. Summary of channels and effects on the labour share 
GVC 
participation 
effects 
Effect on 
labour 
productivity 
Effect 
on real 
wages 
Effect on 
wages of 
high-skilled 
workers 
Effect on 
wages of low-
skilled 
workers 
Relevant 
process 
𝑘 ↑ +  + – Industrial 
upgrading 𝐴 ↑ +  + – 
𝛾 ↓  – + – Social 
upgrading 𝑚 ↑  – + – 
Notes: 𝑘 = capital intensity; 𝐴 = capital-augmenting technological change; 𝛾 = labour’s bargaining power; 𝑚 = 
markup 
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Table 2. The effect of GVC participation on the labour share 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sector group Manufac. Services Total Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. 
Skill group All All All All All HS MS LS 
ln(Capital Intensity)t -0.151* 0.092* -0.020 0.033 -0.132 0.365** 0.009 -0.086  
(0.052) (0.058) (0.775) (0.109) (0.167) (0.048) (0.965) (0.590) 
ln(Exports LW)t-1 0.004 0.004 -0.006 -0.012** 0.021 -0.146 0.089*** 0.039  
(0.876) (0.576) (0.549) (0.039) (0.384) (0.137) (0.008) (0.391) 
ln(Exports HW)t-1 -0.166** -0.004* -0.003 -0.014** -0.148** -0.183 -0.272*** 0.007  
(0.014) (0.068) (0.357) (0.026) (0.037) (0.368) (0.000) (0.927) 
∆ln(Union Density)t 0.095*** 0.039 0.039* 0.039*** 0.084** -0.038 0.070 0.081  
(0.001) (0.326) (0.082) (0.006) (0.026) (0.638) (0.144) (0.223) 
∆ln(XR)t 0.143*** -0.000 0.009 0.073*** 0.130** 0.163 0.136** 0.045  
(0.006) (0.989) (0.613) (0.000) (0.033) (0.181) (0.010) (0.521) 
ln(S)t-1 0.907*** 0.784*** 0.716*** 0.869*** 0.872*** 0.700*** 0.294 0.525  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.366) (0.201) 
ln(S)t-2 0.091** 0.100* 0.099*** 0.060* 0.080 0.180*** 0.015 0.019  
(0.024) (0.063) (0.004) (0.077) (0.116) (0.003) (0.744) (0.784) 
ln(S)t-3 -0.186*** -0.059 -0.111*** -0.204*** -0.201*** -0.184** -0.112** -0.103  
(0.000) (0.268) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.038) (0.043) (0.156) 
ln(Skill Share)t 
 
  
  
-0.540*** 0.572*** -1.217***   
  
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant 
 
  -0.371*** 
 
     
  (0.000) 
 
   
Hansen 0.462 0.361 0.061 
 
0.760 0.004 0.391 0.051 
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.003 0.003 0.497 0.247 
AR2 0.848 0.389 0.139 
 
0.757 0.598 0.119 0.544 
Instruments 34 34 34 
 
27 28 28 28 
Industries 82 84 166 82 82 82 82 82 
F-test 6.195 50.567 15.126 115.296 4.716 10.546 8.902 36.798 
Observations 1289 1253 2542 1371 738 738 738 738 
Period 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-07 95-07 95-07 95-07 
Notes: The dependent variable (𝑆) is the sectoral adjusted labour share. Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ with one instrument column per variable. P-values below the 
estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
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restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments, Industries, and 
F-test, are the number of instruments used, number of cross-sections, and the F-test statistic. 
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Table 3. The effect of GVCs on real wages and labour productivity 
Dependent variable Capital Intensity Labour Productivity Real Wages 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Sector Group Manufac. Services Total Manufac. Services Total Manufac. Services Total 
ln(Exports LW)t-1 -0.014 -0.001 -0.016 0.004 -0.017 -0.010 0.016 0.005 0.002  
(0.812) (0.943) (0.586) (0.895) (0.120) (0.418) (0.607) (0.590) (0.907) 
ln(Exports HW)t-1 0.121 0.003 -0.001 0.168*** 0.003 0.008* -0.208*** -0.003 -0.006  
(0.180) (0.448) (0.932) (0.005) (0.244) (0.089) (0.005) (0.263) (0.207) 
∆ln(union density)t -0.025 0.092** 0.041 -0.101*** -0.100* -0.102*** 0.099** 0.023 0.066  
(0.528) (0.048) (0.287) (0.008) (0.054) (0.008) (0.028) (0.655) (0.106) 
∆ln(XR)t -0.229** -0.144* -0.070 -0.110** -0.023 0.002 0.171*** 0.008 0.020  
(0.018) (0.065) (0.535) (0.028) (0.438) (0.946) (0.004) (0.849) (0.576) 
ln(Capital Intensity)t-1     0.150 -0.015 0.081 -0.131 0.047 -0.080  
    (0.119) (0.752) (0.502) (0.167) (0.282) (0.304) 
ln(Capital Intensity)t-1 0.549*** 0.737* 0.474*         
 (0.001) (0.054) (0.083)         
ln(Capital Intensity)t-2 -0.119*** -0.041 -0.028          
(0.001) (0.719) (0.643)         
ln(Capital Intensity)t-3 -0.050 0.046 0.022          
(0.179) (0.475) (0.506)         
ln(Productivity)t         0.924*** 1.032*** 1.251***  
        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Productivity)t-1     0.909*** 0.573*** 0.765*** -0.733** -0.769*** -0.859***  
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Productivity)t-2     -0.026 0.025 -0.002      
    (0.544) (0.534) (0.923)     
ln(Productivity)t-3     -0.001 0.053 0.030      
    (0.985) (0.136) (0.334)     
ln(Real Wage)t 0.384** 0.015 -0.007 0.816*** 0.601*** 0.466**      
(0.046) (0.948) (0.974) (0.000) (0.001) (0.012)     
ln(Real Wage)t-1 0.170 0.012 0.426 -0.664*** -0.409** -0.378*** 0.784*** 0.811*** 0.763***  
(0.316) (0.961) (0.118) (0.000) (0.027) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Real Wage)t-2         0.045 -0.000 0.010  
        (0.152) (0.990) (0.590) 
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ln(Real Wage)t-3         -0.056* -0.027 -0.050**  
        (0.091) (0.314) (0.029) 
Hansen 0.446 0.056 0.023 0.078 0.059 0.029 0.217 0.083 0.016 
AR1 0.080 0.197 0.156 0.000 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.301 0.405 0.456 0.026 0.393 0.110 0.174 0.247 0.053 
Instruments 34 34 34 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Industries 70 73 143 70 73 143 70 73 143 
F-test 10.761 15.791 13.175 65.651 74.012 104.261 48.040 350.407 145.842 
Observations 1109 1098 2207 1109 1098 2207 1109 1098 2207 
Period 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 
Notes: Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ with one instrument column per variable. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. Instruments, Industries, and F-test, are the 
number of instruments used, number of cross-sections, and the F-test statistic. 
  
41 
APPENDIX 
 
A1: Industrial and social upgrading – a mapping of industries 
In this section, we map the industries in our sample along a matrix that describes changes in 
the labour share, labour productivity, measured as the ratio of real value added to people 
engaged, and real wages, measured as real labour compensation per person engaged. Figure 
A1.1 reports the growth rates of the three variables at the country level.   
 
Figure A1.1. Growth rates of the labour share, labour productivity and real wages 
 
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD. 
 
Labour productivity and real wages increased at the country level during the 1995-2014 period. 
This is consistent with a case of simultaneous industrial and social upgrading. 
Next, we examine the evolution of these variables at the industry level. To allow a more 
detailed analysis we discern from equation (2) six different cases that illustrate the relationship 
between changes in labour productivity, real wages, the labour share, and industrial and social 
upgrading. Cases I-III imply an increase in the labour share, whereas cases IV-VI imply a 
decline. Cases I, IV and V are consistent with industrial upgrading, as labour productivity 
increases (Δ𝑦>0). Cases I, II and IV are associated with social upgrading, narrowly defined by 
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increasing real wages (Δ𝑤𝑟>0). However, only cases I and IV are consistent with both social 
and industrial upgrading. Case I implies that labour has benefitted more than capital from GVC 
participation, whereas case IV implies the opposite. This is summarised in Table A1.2. 
 
Table A1.2. Different cases of industrial and social upgrading 
Cases ∆𝑆 Conditions Industrial Upgrading Social Upgrading 
I ∆𝑆>0  ∆𝑦 >0 & ∆𝑤𝑟>0 & ∆𝑦 < ∆𝑤𝑟 ✓  ✓ 
II ∆𝑆>0  ∆𝑦 <0 & ∆𝑤𝑟>0   ✓ 
III ∆𝑆>0  ∆𝑦 <0 & ∆𝑤𝑟<0 & ∆𝑦 < ∆𝑤𝑟   
IV ∆𝑆<0  ∆𝑦 >0 & ∆𝑤𝑟>0 & ∆𝑦 > ∆𝑤𝑟  ✓  ✓ 
V ∆𝑆<0  ∆𝑦 >0 & ∆𝑤𝑟<0  ✓  
VI ∆𝑆<0  ∆𝑦 <0 & ∆𝑤𝑟<0 & ∆𝑦 > ∆𝑤𝑟   
Notes: 𝑆 = labour share; 𝑦 = labour productivity; 𝑤𝑟= real wage 
 
Table A1.3 maps our data to the different cases for each country. The second column lists the 
total number of industries for which reliable data is available20, the third column lists the 
number of industries where the labour share declined, and the remaining columns the number 
of industries that correspond to the six cases in Table A1.2.  
 
Table A1.3. Industry mapping  
Labour Share  ∆𝑆>0 ∆𝑆<0 
Labour Productivity  ∆𝑦 >0 ∆𝑦 <0 ∆𝑦 >0 ∆𝑦 <0 
Real Wage  ∆𝑤𝑟>0 ∆𝑤𝑟<0 ∆𝑤𝑟>0 ∆𝑤𝑟<0 
 Industries ∆𝑆<0 I II III IV V VI 
Korea 25 13 10 1 1 10 1 2 
Mexico 24 21 3 0 0 10 10 1 
Turkey 22 6 13 3 0 2 2 2 
Brazil 25 9 10 4 2 4 2 3 
China 23 5 18 0 0 5 0 0 
Indonesia 24 12 7 2 3 5 1 6 
India 23 13 9 1 0 11 1 1 
Σ 166 79 70 11 6 47 17 15 
%-share 100% 48% 42% 7% 4% 28% 10% 9% 
Notes: 𝑆 = labour share; 𝑦 = labour productivity; 𝑤𝑟= real wage 
 
Overall, moving from the country to the industry level gives a more nuanced picture. We find 
evidence that is consistent with different combinations of industrial and social upgrading. 135 
 
20 After adjustment as described in Section 4.  
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industries (81%) experienced increases in labour productivity, consistent with industrial 
upgrading. Labour benefitted more than capital from the increased productivity in roughly half 
of those cases, as evidence by an increasing labour share (70 industries). Strikingly, in 17 
industries that experienced increasing labour productivity, the real wage declined, indicating 
that labour lost out not only in relative but also in absolute terms.21 The majority of these 
industries (10) are situated in Mexico, equally split between manufacturing and service sectors. 
Of these, the largest decline in real wages happened in manufacturing industries such as ‘Basic 
and Fabricated Metal’, ‘Food, Beverages and Tobacco’ and ‘Other Non-Metallic Minerals’. 
These industries also experienced a large increase in GVC participation (intermediate intra-
industry exports to advanced economies increased by 51%, 46% and 7% respectively). 32 
industries or 19% of all industries (concentrated in Brazil, 9 industries, and Indonesia, 11 
industries) experienced a decline in labour productivity, consistent with industrial 
downgrading. Most of these industries (21) also experienced declining real wages, consistent 
with a low-road strategy where competitiveness is maintained through wage suppression.  
 
 
  
 
21 FOXCONN can be seen as an example of a firm that has achieved industrial upgrading as evidenced 
by their internationalisation and expansion into higher value added products, while maintaining a 
culture of forced and unpaid overtime work, and military-style management practices (Barrientos et al., 
2011).  
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Figure A2. Labour share by skill group  
 
 
Notes: Labour compensation of high-, medium- and low-skilled workers (as defined by their level of education) 
as a ratio to total value added. ‘Total’ reports aggregate labour compensation as a ratio to value added.     
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD. 
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Table A3. Industry classification 
ISIC4 code Description 
A Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 
B Mining and quarrying 
C10-C12 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 
C13-C15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 
C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
C17-18; 
J58-60 
Manufacture of paper and paper products; Printing and reproduction of 
recorded media; Motion picture, video and television programme production, 
sound recording and music publishing activities; programming and 
broadcasting activities 
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products  
C20-21 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
C24-25 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 
C26-27 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products; Manufacture of 
electrical equipment 
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
C29-30 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers and other transport 
equipment  
C31-33, 
E37-39 
Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing; Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment; Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and 
disposal activities; materials recovery; remediation activities and other waste 
management services  
D35-36 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; Water collection, 
treatment and supply 
F Construction 
G45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
G46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
G47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
H49 Land transport and transport via pipelines 
H50 Water transport 
H51 Air transport 
H52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation 
H53; J61 Postal and courier activities; Telecommunications; 
I Accommodation and food service activities 
K64-66 Financial Intermediation 
L68 Real estate activities 
J62-J63; 
M69-75; N 
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; information 
service activities 
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Table A4. Variable definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics 
Variable definition Observations Mean Standard Deviation Source 
labour share = Si,j =
labour compensationi,j
value addedi,j
 
2,545 0.451 0.191 WIOD 
labour share(high − skilled)i,j =
labour compensation(high−skilled)i,j
value addedi,j
  738 0.092 0.075 WIOD 
labour share(medium − skilled)i,j =
labour compensation(medium − skilled)i,j
value addedi,j
 
738 0.183 0.075 WIOD 
labour share(low − skilled)i,j =
labour compensation(low − skilled)i,j
value addedi,j
 
738 0.161 0.087 WIOD 
capital intensity = ki,j =
capital stocki,j
value addedi,j
 
2,545 3.079 3.375 WIOD 
Exports LWi,j =
(intra − industry intermediate exports from the rest of the world)i,j
gross outputi,j
 
2,545 0.012 0.027 
WIOD 
Exports HWi,j =
(intra − industry intermediate exports from high wage countries)i,j
gross outputi,j
 
2,545 0.011 0.019 
WIOD 
union densityj =
union membersj
total employeesj
 
2,545 0.175 0.107 
ICTWSS 5.1 
XRj = nominal USD exchange rate 2,545 0.225 0.352 WIOD 
labour productivityi,j =
real value addedi,j
hours workedi,j
 
2,210 6.561 3.376 WIOD 
real wagei,j =
real average labour compensationi,j
hours workedi,j
 
2,210 5.684 3.464 WIOD 
offshoring LWi,j =
(intra − industry intermediate imports from the rest of the world)i,j
gross outputi,j
 
1,289 0.022 0.030 
WIOD 
offshoring HWi,j =
(intra − industry intermediate imports from high wage countries)i,j
gross outputi,j
 
1,289 0.027 0.035 
WIOD 
Final imports =
(final imports of consumption and capital goods)i,j
gross outputi,j
   
1,289 0.088 0.153 
WIOD 
Govti =
government consumptionj
gross domestic productj
 
1,064 0.252 0.154 
World Bank 
minimum wagei,j =
national minimum wagesj
average labour compensation per hours workedi,j
 
1,289 13.035 3.410 
OECD, ILO & WIOD 
Note: i stands for industry and j stands for country    
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Table A5. Alternative estimation methods 
Estimation Method External instruments System-GMM Mean-Group Weighted Diff-GMM 
Specification  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Sector group Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Services Manufac. Services Manufac. Services 
ln(Capital Intensity)t -0.104 
 
0.022 -0.017 0.166** 0.239 -0.047 0.025  
(0.146) 
 
(0.674) (0.285) (0.017) (0.121) (0.686) (0.695) 
ln(Exports LW)t-1 -0.006 -0.063* -0.031 0.006 0.130** 0.021 -0.040* -0.001  
(0.797) (0.070) (0.176) (0.232) (0.046) (0.659) (0.073) (0.906) 
ln(Exports HW)t-1 -0.111** -0.149** -0.066** -0.000 -0.115** -0.032 -0.108** -0.003*  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.858) (0.028) (0.642) (0.012) (0.082) 
∆ln(Union Density)t 0.081*** 0.104*** 0.065*** 0.034 0.087 0.054 0.061** 0.030  
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.380) (0.758) (0.801) (0.037) (0.497) 
∆ln(XR)t 0.103** 0.156*** 0.098*** 0.017 0.164 0.046 0.111** -0.010  
(0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.621) (0.256) (0.748) (0.011) (0.752) 
ln(S)t-1 0.776*** 0.692*** 0.831*** 0.953*** 0.404** 0.357* 0.676*** 0.729***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.084) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(S)t-2 0.079* 
 
0.067** 0.140** -0.104 -0.315** 0.069 0.092  
(0.061) 
 
(0.043) (0.023) (0.414) (0.030) (0.128) (0.112) 
ln(S)t-3 -0.165*** 
 
-0.196*** -0.148** -0.102 -0.121 -0.156*** -0.082  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.024) (0.383) (0.272) (0.000) (0.152) 
Constant 
  
-0.888*** -0.045 -1.222 -0.187 
 
    
(0.001) (0.548) (0.126) (0.868) 
 
 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Hansen  0.166 
 
0.075 0.156   0.157 0.206 
AR1 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000   0.003 0.004 
AR2 0.973 
 
0.634 0.079   0.523 0.270 
Instruments 36 10.518 56 57   34 34 
Industries 82 82 82 85 82 80 82 85 
F-test 10.256 87.755 71.233 485.933   11.829 37.434 
Observations 1289 1371 1371 1345 1371 1313 1289 1256 
Period 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 
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Notes: The dependent variable (𝑆) is the sectoral adjusted labour share. Estimation method indicated in row 1. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, 
**, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2 is 
the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. Instruments, Industries, 
and F-test, are the number of instruments used, number of cross-sections, and the F-test statistic. 
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Table A6. Alternative measures of GVC participation and other determinants of the labour share 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sector group Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. Manufac. 
ln(Capital Intensity)t -0.106 -0.040 -0.028 0.150* -0.046 -0.134* -0.162** -0.144* -0.050 -0.098 
 (0.309) (0.677) (0.774) (0.057) (0.609) (0.079) (0.044) (0.072) (0.549) (0.246) 
ln(Exports LW)t-1  -0.021 -0.008   -0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.015 -0.016 
  (0.372) (0.763)   (0.866) (0.949) (0.917) (0.509) (0.479) 
ln(Exports HW)t-1  -0.102** -0.111**   -0.202*** -0.195** -0.161** -0.150*** -0.099** 
  (0.018) (0.026)   (0.006) (0.017) (0.019) (0.001) (0.027) 
ln(Broad Exports LW)t-1 0.001          
 (0.989)          
ln(Broad Exports HW)t-1 -0.132*          
 (0.065)          
ln(Offshoring LW)t-1  -0.021 -0.020        
  (0.460) (0.456)        
ln(Offshoring HW)t-1  0.040 0.046        
  (0.455) (0.378)        
∆ln(union density)t 0.079*** 0.072** 0.070** -0.015 0.023 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.092*** 0.071** 0.089*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.733) (0.650) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) 
∆ln(XR)t 0.114** 0.095** 0.096** 0.116*** 0.019 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.139*** 0.117** 0.076* 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.003) (0.713) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.012) (0.095) 
ln(Final Imports)t-1   -0.031        
   (0.464)        
Inward FDIt-1    -0.143*       
    (0.086)       
Outward FDIt-1     -0.603*      
     (0.090)      
ln(non-FDI flows)t-1      -0.040     
      (0.140)     
ln(Finglob)t-1       -0.052    
       (0.318)    
ln(Labour Laws)t-1        0.034   
        (0.624)   
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∆ln(Minimum Wage)t         0.135  
         (0.168)  
∆ln(Gov-Cons)t          0.252** 
          (0.030) 
ln(Labour share)t-1 0.826*** 0.734*** 0.776*** 0.610*** 0.586*** 0.945*** 0.918*** 0.894*** 0.669*** 0.678*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(Labour Share)t-2 0.082** 0.092** 0.084** -0.101 -0.218* 0.089** 0.094** 0.093** 0.106*** 0.044 
 (0.044) (0.019) (0.027) (0.452) (0.088) (0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.004) (0.297) 
ln(Labour Share)t-3 -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.158* -0.092 -0.184*** -0.164*** -0.183*** -0.180*** -0.107** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.286) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) 
Hansen 0.473 0.227 0.400 0.067 0.539 0.745 0.830 0.456 0.867 0.039 
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR2 0.806 0.519 0.495 0.998 0.343 0.763 0.937 0.835 0.722 0.311 
Instruments 34 42 46 14 14 35 35 35 38 38 
Industries 82 82 82 22 22 70 70 82 70 82 
F-test 9.314 8.347 13.571 16.807 7.907 5.191 4.862 6.514 5.577 7.442 
Observations 1289 1289 1289 297 132 1109 1109 1289 1064 1289 
Period 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 95-14 
Notes: The dependent variable is the sectoral adjusted labour share. Estimation method is ‘difference GMM’ with one instrument column per variable. P-values below the 
estimation coefficients in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions for all instruments. AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments, Industries, and 
F-test, are the number of instruments used, number of cross-sections, and the F-test statistic. 
